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ABSTRACT 
 Previous work on a subset of the internet has identified a number of unique 
behaviors in ICMP timestamp responses. In this study we expand to studying the entire 
routable IPv4 address space, surveying ICMP timestamp responsiveness and the 
prevalence of specific response behaviors. We introduce a new behavior called “uptime” 
to the existing behavioral classification taxonomy. Additionally, we combine 
banner-grabbing scan data with our ICMP response classifications to evaluate the utility 
of ICMP timestamp behaviors in device fingerprinting. 
v 
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In computing, fingerprinting is a way to identify a computing entity (such as a device or
file) by using only a restricted amount of data. Fingerprinting has a wide range of pur-
poses, including network surveys and identification of vulnerabilities. As such, many
fingerprinting methods and tools exist—for example, Nmap is a tool which identifies
operating systems through IP and TCP probing [1]. Fingerprinting generally leverages
implementation-specific differences, such as slightly different file contents or responses to
unanticipated situations.
Traditional active fingerprinting techniques focus primarily on operating systems and end
nodes, and can be less effective for devices like routers. Fortunately, there remain promising
options for such devices. One is the long-standing internet protocol ICMPdue to its presence
on all networked IPv4 devices.
Recent work [2] has discovered a new form of information leakage in a disused feature of
ICMP—timestamp messages. Devices respond to timestamp requests with a number of
discrete, classifiable behaviors rather than one consistent standard. This work seeks to build
on this discovery and understand whether different devices, manufacturers, or operating
systems can be fingerprinted through these distinctive behaviors.
1.1 Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
ICMP is a baked-in feature of the Internet Protocol (IP). It is used primarily to relay error
and diagnostic messages in the IP environment, such as for failed transmissions and router
discovery/selection. All IP-participating nodes must implement ICMP in order to allow for
proper connectivity and participation in higher-level protocols and services [3], including
not only the World WideWeb but also internal services like Active Directory. Furthermore,
many basic software utilities rely on ICMP messages, such as ping and traceroute [4].
Some network administrators may want to opt out of ICMP in order to more stringently
secure their networks. Primarily this is because ICMP pings allow for an easy, low-
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bandwidth device discovery by prompting them to respond with an ICMP echo message.
This capability has been used for full-scale surveys of the internet [5], but can be deployed
equally well by an adversary to find attack surfaces. Similarly, traceroute returns a list of
router hops a packet went through to reach a certain IP address; administrators may be
wary of letting potential adversaries discover network topologies. ICMP is easily spoofed,
allowing for covert reconnaissance or denial of service (DOS) attacks [6]. ICMP can even
be used for tunneling of arbitrary information [7].
However, it is impractical for internet-connected hosts to opt entirely out of ICMP in IPv4.1
Pings allow a network administrator to easily determine whether a device of their own is
up. ICMP messages communicate where a route may be broken, or whether a packet is
taking a route it should not. They report when packets are too large for a link to support and
must be fragmented; this same capability can be used to discover the largest permissible
packet for a certain route [3]. Without ICMP, network troubleshooting loses efficacy, and
communication may fail altogether.
At best a firewall can be configured to block certain types of messages, or restrict specifically
out- or inbound packets. Many network administrators neglect to do even this.
Among the lesser-known—but not yet deprecated—ICMP message types are timestamp
and timestamp reply messages. As a broad description, timestamp messages send out an
originating timestamp and expect two timestamps in response from the recipient. We further
detail this feature in section 2.1.
This functionality was previously used in the Internet Clock Service [8] for clock syn-
chronization and one-way delay measurements; it has long-since been replaced by the
UDP-based Network Time Protocol [9] in common usage. In practice, there is little legit-
imate usage today, and when left open to arbitrary hosts it is listed in MITRE’S Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) as CVE-1999-0524 [10]. Allowing ICMP times-
tamp messages leads to information leakage and associated vulnerabilities, among them the
ability to attack random number generators seeded with a device’s current time [10].
1ICMP is even more crucial to IPv6, but the updated IPv6 version of ICMP does not implement timestamps
in the same way; as such IPv6 is excluded from this study.
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1.2 Scope
Surprisingly, Rye and Beverly found that 15% of a probed subset of internet devices do
respond to ICMP timestamp messages [2]. This is more than we expected given warnings
like CVE-1999-0524, and the lack of legitimate usage for the feature. Thus, we seek to
extend previous work by taking a full scan of the IPv4 internet and determining what overall
percentage is responsive.
Additionally, we will classify all responsive IP addresses into a taxonomy previously devel-
oped in Rye and Beverly’s work [2]. We will use banner and header data from application-
layer protocols in order to identify addresses, then analyze them for correlations between
identity and behavior. With this information, we will seek to determine whether device
fingerprinting is possible from ICMP timestamp behaviors.
1.3 Summary of Findings
• 6% of routable IPv4 addresses respond to ICMP timestamp requests.
• Only 30-35% of routable IPv4 addresses respond to ICMP timestamp requests in a
way conformant to RFC 792 [3].
• A majority of unique device models (as implied by unique banner responses) are at
least 50% consistent in responding with only a single timestamp behavior. Some are
100% consistent.
• Certain timestamp behaviors are only seen in devices from one manufacturer, and
certainmodels of device only show a single behavior (as implied by banner responses).
• A newly described behavior known as “uptime” shows up in about 4% of ICMP
timestamp responsive devices.
1.4 Thesis Structure
1. Chapter 1 introduces fingerprinting, ICMP timestamps, and the scope of our research.
2. Chapter 2 discusses related works, including summarizing Sundial’s taxonomy for
ICMP timestamp behaviors, and gives a background in the kinds of data we will be
collecting.
3. Chapter 3 describes challenges we faced and summarizes our methodology, including
the ways we collected data, reduced complicating factors, and chose boundaries for
3
our analysis.
4. Chapter 4 relays our results and our analyses, including both the prevalence of ICMP
timestamp responses and the consistency of behaviors among responses and manu-
facturers.




This chapter discusses ICMP timestamps in more detail, summarizes previous works on
ICMP timestamp fingerprinting, describes and enumerates ICMP timestamp behaviors, and
covers message banners and headers used for identification.
2.1 ICMP Timestamps
Both timestamp and timestamp reply messages consist of eight fields.
The first five fields of a timestamp message are all headers. The type field specifies whether
this is a request (13) or a reply (14). ICMP timestamps have no associated codes, so the
code should always be zero. The checksum field is the Internet Checksum [11], and is itself
treated as zero when its contents are being calculated. Both the id and sequence are intended
for use by the request sender and should be duplicated, unchanged, by the respondent.






Figure 2.1. ICMP Timestamp Message Fields. 
Adapted from [2], [3].
The last three fields of a timestamp message contain timestamps. The first timestamp is an
Originate Timestamp, filled in by the timestamp requester when they last interact with the
message. The next two timestamp fields are intended to be filled out by the respondent; the
Receive Timestamp upon the first time they interact with it, and the Transmit Timestamp
upon the last time before the message is sent back. The timestamps are intended to be
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in milliseconds since midnight Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), but can be substituted
with another format if the high order bit of the timestamp is set [2], [3].
2.2 Related Works
A number of previous studies investigated fingerprinting with ICMP timestamps. Notable
examples of this include Kohno et al.’s work on remote physical device fingerprinting [12]
and Cristea and Groza’s work on fingerprinting smartphones [13].
However, neither of these are applicable to behavioral fingerprinting. Kohno et al. relied
upon clock skew, a phenomenon in which device clocks do not progress at the exact same
rate due tominiscule variations in hardware (rather than implementation). They also focused
primarily on Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) timestamps rather than ICMP, despite
outlining a possible method for the latter. Cristea and Groza reliably differentiate between
individual devices by their clock skew. They do not, however, examine differences between
operating systems, manufacturers, and product models. Additionally, their method has only
been tested on smartphones and was not tested in measurement periods of less than 15
minutes.
Furthermore, all previous studies of ICMP timestamps we are aware of analyze compar-
atively small amounts of public nodes, even when they do look into ICMP timestamp
responsiveness. Anagnostakis et al. probed 400k routers, and reported a 93% success rate
in eliciting timestamp responses [14]; this work was published in 2003, over 15 years ago
relative to this study, and before network security was nearly as emphasized as it is in the
modern day. Buchholz and Tjaden investigated a list of approximately 8k web servers over a
period of six months when studying clock management and reported a 41% response rate to
ICMP requests [15]; their work was published in 2007. The Information Sciences Institute
performs ICMP ping scans of the IPv4 address space every few months, but does not test
other ICMP message types [5]. The only work which studies ICMP timestamp responsive-
ness in the modern internet, within the past few years, is Rye and Beverly’s 2019 “Sundial”
work. Sundial scanned 14.5 million hosts across the internet, including one address for
every /24 routable subnet [2]. It elicited responses from approximately 2.2 million, 15% of
what was probed.
Sundialmade an additional contribution to the field of ICMP timestamp research by focusing
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on response behavior rather than clock skew. Although there is a defined expected behavior
in RFC 792 [3], Sundial discovered many different implementations and behaviors in
practice.
This work seeks to make two improvements on Sundial work. First, we introduce “Sunup.”
Sunup scans the full routable IPv4 space for ICMP responsiveness and behavior inference.
Second, Sunup seeks to compare ICMP timestamp behavior classifications and header
responses from scanned IP addresses to see if this data is useful for fingerprinting.
2.3 Sundial Behavioral Taxonomy
The ICMP timestamp behaviors discovered by Sundial are believed to be due to differ-
ing implementations on the routers and end devices involved. As ICMP timestamps are
not deprecated, operating systems are required to implement them. However, they are a
functionally unused feature that are likely to be left unmaintained. As a result, a device’s
implementation of these ICMPmessages can be neglected even when it results in the device
being non-conformant to RFC standards [3].
Regardless of the cause, devices (“respondents”) are classifiable into a taxonomy of one or
more groups based on their responses to four specific ICMP timestamp requests (sent by a
“prober”).
These behaviors are as follows, with some added or reorganized since Sundial [2]:
1. Correct: A behavior that is conformant to RFC 792. The receive and transmit
timestamps are both in milliseconds, and are both nonzero except at the appropriate
time (midnight UTC). They may have identical timestamps if otherwise conformant,
given we make the assumption that processing time took less than a millisecond.
Denoted in results as “correct.”
2. MSB-Correct: Timestamp values have the most significant bit set, but otherwise
conform to correct behavior. Denoted in results as “correctMSB.”
3. MSB: A response that has the most significant bit set. Responses that do not provide
a timestamp relative to midnight UTC or do not provide it in milliseconds are still
allowed by RFC 792, as long as they have the most significant bit set. Denoted in
results as “msb.”
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4. Lazy: Receive and transmit timestamps are equal due to the device simply duplicating
the two, or due to genuinely processing a packet in under a millisecond, as assumed in
correct. As there is no way of differentiating these two groups with our data, devices
with identical timestamps—with the exception of those stuck at 0 or 1—are always
classified as lazy. Denoted in results as “lazy.”
5. Normal: A behavior which responds with receive and transmit timestamps that are
not identical, and are also non-zero—i.e., not lazy and potentially correct. Denoted
in results as “normal.”
6. Checksum-lazy: A response is provided even when the request’s checksum is incor-
rect. Denoted in results as “checksumLazy.”
7. Stuck: The respondent always replies with the same values regardless of input and
when requests are sent. (This includes subsets that only respond with 0, 1, or little-
endian 1.) Denoted in results as “stuck,” “stuck0,” “stuck1,” and “stuckLE1.”
8. Reflection: The respondent duplicates whatever is in the receive and transmit times-
tamps in the request. Denoted in results as “reflect.”
9. Linux htons() bug: Replies are truncated to a 16-bit value. Denoted in results as
“buggy.”
10. Uptime: Respondents that appear to be responding with their uptime rather than time
relative to UTC. Denoted in results as “uptime.”
11. Millisecond: Respondents which reply with time in milliseconds, as evaluated based
on two different responses. Denoted in results as “millisecond.”
12. Second: Respondents which reply with time in seconds, as evaluated based on two
different responses. Denoted in results as “second.”
13. Timezone: Encode timestamps which appear to be relative to midnight in a non-UTC
time. Denoted in results as “timezone.”
14. Epoch reference: Encode timestamps relative to the Unix epoch. Not present in
results.
15. Little-Endian: Receive and/or transmit timestamps in little-endian four-byte integers,
but otherwise correctly. Denoted in results as “correctLE.”
16. Unknown: Any responses that cannot be classified into the above types. Denoted in
results as “unknown.”
Some devices display a certain behavior only in the second of the three timestamps, or only
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in the third. Such responses can be denoted with “Rx” for the second and “Tx” for the
third. Note also that groups are not necessarily mutually exclusive—e.g., a device can send
a packet which is simultaneously a “timezone” and a “checksumLazy” packet.
2.4 Banners and Protocols
As this work is an attempt to see if fingerprinting via ICMP behaviors is possible, we collect
a number of headers/banners from scanned IP addresses. These are retrieved through
Censys [16], an internet-wide scanning service that provides free data access to researchers.
Banners are messages presented to a user upon interacting with a device on a specific
port/through a specific protocol. Headers, on the other hand, tend to be at the beginning of
complete segments of network data—they contain metadata about the packet or message.
Both leak information which can itself be used for fingerprinting, such as manufacturer or
model names. However, their reliability is not absolute; banners can be modified by the
owner of a device, and headers can be entered incorrectly or deliberately manipulated.
If a device can be fingerprinted through banners and responds to timestamp requests, and
all devices of that model consistently show the same behavior, we can tentatively conclude
the behavior is a trait associated with the model. Then this ICMP behavior can be used for
fingerprinting when banners are not present or are deliberately modified.
Certain headers/banners are responses to commonly used protocols, but others are more
uncommon. The full list of header/banner types collected is as follows:
1. File Transfer Protocol (FTP): A common protocol used for transferring files which
requires two port connections: one for control and one for the data. FTP responds
with a banner on the first connection, generally asking for login and authentication.
2. Secure Shell Protocol (SSH): A common protocol used for secure remote logins
and command line access. It generally responds with the network utility a server is
using to run SSH.
3. Telnet: An older protocol generally used for remote command line access, Telnet is
less secure than SSH. It is intended more broadly for unencrypted communication
and generally responds with a login prompt.
4. Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP): Used primarily for supporting the web and
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providing web content. HTTP headers provide a wealth of information useful for web
functionality, most of which is less useful for fingerprinting. In this case, just the
server portion of the HTTP header was collected.
5. CPE WAN Management Protocol (CWMP): A protocol for communicating be-
tween configuration servers and customer equipment, i.e., equipment used by a sub-
scriber to carrier, such as telephones and routers. CWMP authentication responses
were collected.
6. BACnet: A protocol for communication with BAC systems, such as heating, lighting,
and access control. BACnet response metadata was collected—namely the manufac-
turer and product fields.
These banners were selected due to commonly presenting identifying information when
they exist. e.g., FTP and Telnet headers often mention the model of the device the protocols




Our methodology involves the collection of timestamp responses, classification, and com-
bination with Censys data. We discuss challenges in analysis, including manufacturer
inconsistencies, banner noisiness, and IP churn. We describe methodological measures
taken to overcome these challenges. Additionally, we leverage public IEEE data on manu-
facturers for use in classification.
3.1 Data Collection
We perform ICMP timestamp scanning ourselves in order to accommodate for behavior
classification probing—namely, four ICMP timestamp requests, all with different parame-
ters. All IP scanning aside from scans for the fourth data set used the existing “sundial”
ZMap [17] module [18].
Four sets of data were collected for analyses. The first group, described as the “primary”
group, included all IP addresses from the entire routable IPv4 space which responded to
ICMP timestamps. The second set focused on all IPs from the IPv4 space which displayed
uptime behavior. The third set focused on routers with uptime behavior. Finally, the fourth
set was a smaller subset of the routable IPv4 space, collected within approximately a single
day.
Dataset Contents Date Initiated # of IPs (thousands)
Primary Full IPv4 scan March 1, 2019 197415.2
Second Uptime scan (primary set) May 11, 2019 8255.5
Third Uptime scan (ITDK) December 3, 2018 88.9
Fourth One-day IPv4 scan August 22, 2019 34.1
Table 3.1. Dataset Summary.
In scanning, we followed ethical guidelines previously used in Sundial work; probing was
done at comparatively slow rates, distributed in time and among networks, and used only
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ICMP packets. These measures were taken to avoid appearing as attack traffic or noticeably
degrading service on any networks. We also provided a method for opting out of scans and
coordinated with local network administrators.
3.1.1 Primary set
Scanning for the primary group of data was done in two stages, and was performed from
CSAIL’s Advanced Network Architecture lab, located at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. The vantage point is connected by Ethernet cable to the local area network,
which resides behind a firewall appliance. While the vantage has a publicly routable IP
address and thus requires no NAT, firewall state maintenance limited experiment probe rate
to several thousand packets per second.
The first stage sent only a single ICMP timestamp request of the “standard” form discussed
in Sundial [2]. Scanning commenced on January 16, 2019, with requests sent at a rate of
1000 packets per second, and ended on February 28, 2019. The intention was to narrow
down the scope of of IPs that were responsive and minimize the number of total probes
required. Non-responsive addresses were discarded prior to the second stage.
In the second stage of scanning, the remaining addresses underwent the full series of four
requests each. Each type of request was performed in an individual round of probing, in
the following order: “standard,” “bad clock,” “bad checksum,” and“duplicate timestamp.”
Rounds were seeded with an identical seed and thus followed the same order of addresses
after initial randomization; a round needed to complete before the next one launched. This
stage ran from March 1, 2019 to March 16, 2019, and requests were sent at the same rate as
the first stage.
Scan data was classified using the previous Sundial methodology. Responses to the standard
probe identified whether a device was normal, lazy, non-UTC, and/or little-endian. Stuck
and reflection devices were identified by standard and duplicate probes. Checksum-lazy
behavior was detected by the bad checksum probe, and buggy behavior was identified by
standard and bad clock probes. Any two probes were suitable for detecting time units used,
and any single probe was sufficient for timezones [2].
Note that this did not classify uptime addresses, which would have been spread through
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other classifications.
3.1.2 Second set: Uptime
The second data set was the group of IP addresses—using addresses from the primary
set—that were determined to have uptime behavior. This was detected in two stages:
first, any address that was classified as correct from the primary set was discounted. The
remaining addresses were probed 5 times over a period of 24 hours, starting May 11,
2019, and had to continuously increase their timestamps at a steady rate to be classified
as uptimers. They were also required to respond with at least one timestamp greater than
milliseconds possible in UTC, but not report a time relative to the Unix epoch.
Probing is ongoing, run from an Amazon AWS instance in “US-East;” it repeats approxi-
mately every 15 minutes and runs at a rate of 10500 packets per second.
3.1.3 Third set: ITDK-Uptime
The third data set is the ITDK-Uptime set. Data from CAIDA’s inferred router IP aliases
from March 2018 [19] was cut down to one address each, for a result of 2,586,711 unique
addresses. These addresses are interesting because they are drawn specifically from router-
level topologies, and can be used in comparing routers and the overall IPv4 space.
Classification probing began on December 3, 2018, and was performed in two stages—in
the first, anything that gave a seemingly correct response to an initial probe was eliminated.
In the second stage, remaining IP addresses were probed 5 times each, with probes 6 hours
apart. This covered a 24-hour time period for each unique address. Anything that was
defined as uptime was kept for the third stage.
The third stage is ongoing; ITDK-Uptime addresses are probed approximately every 15
minutes, with a rate of 2000 packets per second. Theoretically, ITDK-uptimer addresses
should be a subset of the overall uptimers in section 3.1.2.
3.1.4 Fourth set: August 22
The final data set was retrieved starting mid-day of August 22, 2019, and probed a random
sample of 215k IP addresses that responded to the first stage of 3.1.1. It performed all four
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timestamp requests on a single IP address before moving on to the next; scanning was run
through a custom C executable rather than Zmap to allow for this.
This scan was significantly slower than previous scans, taking approximately 30 hours total
for about 0.1% of the addresses in section 3.1.1. The scanner was made to sleep for half a
second between every address to avoid problems with dropped packets.
The fourth dataset was obtained for reasons to be detailed in section 3.5. Censys data for
this scan was retrieved separately, on August 23, 2019.
3.1.5 Opt-outs
We received opt-out requests only for the ITDK-Uptime scan, the third data set. AS7922
opted-out on March 20, 2019, excluding 3,976 addresses, and one individual from AS4713
opted-out on June 25, 2019.
3.2 Challenges
Once classified and stripped to IP and classification, scan data was combined with Censys
banner data.2 Entries that existed in the scan data but not Censys were noted as ICMP-
responsive but not present in Censys. Entries found in Censys but not the scan data were
skipped.
Headers retrieved included FTP from port 21; SSH from port 22; HTTP from ports 80,
8080, 8888, and 16992; Telnet from ports 23 and 2323, CWMP from port 7547; and BACnet
from port 47808. There were numerous complications in analyzing the resulting data.
3.2.1 Responsiveness and accuracy
Sundial probing was restricted to the four packets necessary for classification and did not
itself scan for additional banners, in order to avoid making an already intrusive scan more
so. Censys historical data was retrieved from the same date that the primary group’s Sundial
scan began.3 This means classifications from late in the scan are a full 16 days behind the
2Censys data was stripped of newlines, null characters, and ~ (tilde) characters for easy CSV storage and
manipulation.
3The fourth set of data described in section 3.1.4 was the one exception, with Censys historical data
retrieved from August 23.
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banners we associated with those IPs. The second and third sets of data are even further off
of the Censys date. Because of this, we anticipate some IP churn to have occurred in the
intervening time.
IP churn occurs when an IP address that previously pointed to one device is reassigned and
now points to another. Generally this happens to dynamic addresses, which are meant to
be transferred constantly as devices connect to and disconnect from a network. (This is in
contrast to static addresses, which are intended to be tied to one device.)
In Xie et al.’s study of dynamic addresses [20], they analyzed a /16 block (a total of 65,536
addresses) and evaluated 7,045 as dynamic addresses—approximately 11%. In a “dynamic-
heavy” sample of 155 million addresses that had email user logins, they evaluated that 75%
were dynamic. They further investigated the volatility of these addresses, concluding that
of dynamic addresses, only 15% have an inter-user time of 7 or more days; i.e., all but 15%
take less than 7 days to be used by another device. This indicates dynamic addresses will
be present and will be reassigned during our scan time.
It is important to note that Xie et al. stated that most dynamic addresses belong to consumer
networks, and are used by personal computers or workstations in small enterprises. These
devices rarely run services like HTTP or FTP, and will not respond with banners—as such,
we assume that a number of these dynamic addresses will be immediately unidentifiable.
However, there are exceptions—many of which were not present in 2007, the time of the
study. Most residential gateways run HTTP for configuration purposes, as do a large amount
of internet of things (IoT) devices, and the service is usually accessible on a standard port
for ease of the user.
We expect to encounter churn both from these common exceptions and from the rarer static
IP reassignment.
Furthermore, not all (or even a majority) of addresses had Censys entries on that date; this
means that while they did respond to ICMP requests at the time Sundial probing occurred,
they did not respond to any of Censys’s queries on that scan date. In the primary and
uptime sets, 31.5 million were found in Censys out of 197 million from the Sundial scan,
approximately 16%—see Figure 3.1. In the ITDK group, 16.2k out of 88.9k were found.
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Figure 3.1. IPs Found in Censys Data, by Unique Combination of Behaviors.
Of addresses forwhichCensys had an entry, some had no responses to any of the protocolswe
were interested in. Of 78.8 million unique addresses that were found overall in Censys—not
all of which corresponded to Sundial scan results—26.7 million were functionally blank.
This rendered identification of an IP address impossible for this study.
Of course, when IP addresses had responses, they did not have them for each individual
protocol. For example, of the 31.5 million in the primary set 3.6 million responded to FTP,
while only 3.6k responded to BACnet.
3.2.2 Noisiness and applicability
The banners gathered had significant amounts of noise, and the variety of noise mechanisms
made it difficult to match functionally-identical banners automatically. For example, the
majority of CWMP banners had a unique nonce, FTP headers often reported active online
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user counts, and several different headers commonly listed their own IP address.
Additionally, banners were not necessarily illuminating or internally consistent. Banners
that did not immediately report model or manufacturer were not feasible to research by hand
due to the volume of unique responses. The lack of banner standardization meant it was
impractical to retrieve manufacturer and model names where a list of known names did not
already exist. Some manufacturers lacked even a single standard way of printing their own
name.
Also, when banners did list manufacturers, they were not necessarily internally consis-
tent—more than one could be listed across the full array of banners. (For example, Asus
could be listed in one banner, while Hewlett Packard was listed in another.) For manu-
facturers known for both hardware and software products, there was no practical way of
differentiating whether a banner was indicating one or the other. This meant it was equally
infeasible to determine which of the manufacturers reported by a device was responsible
for the ICMP implementation.
For case studies of banner variety and clarity, see Appendix A.
3.3 Manufacturer Classification
In order to search banners for manufacturers, we first needed to obtain a list of potential man-
ufacturers. For this we referred to the IEEE Registration Authority’s list of organizationally
unique identifier (OUI)s [21]. The purchase of an OUI provides the right to generate iden-
tifiers such as media access control (MAC) addresses, which are required for interfacing
with networks. As such, nearly every vendor or manufacturer has ownership of an OUI.
Furthermore, larger manufacturers require multiple such OUIs, as a single OUI can only
cover 16.8 million network interfaces. Apple, for example, has 352 distinct OUIs as of
2016 [22].
Our OUI list was retrieved from linuxnet.ca [23] rather than directly from the IEEE Regis-
tration Authority. This version is sanitized, removing incorrect or unnecessary data artifacts
and fixing spelling errors or vendor name inconsistencies.
For the purposes of our analysis, we decided to focus on “major” manufacturers, which we
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defined as those which had purchased a minimum of ten OUIs under a (sanitized) identical
name.4 When filtered in this way, we obtained with a list of just over 100 names.
These names were sorted and subsidiaries were combined by hand (e.g., Sony Mobile
Communications Inc and Sony Interactive Entertainment Inc. were grouped as Sony).
Additionally, common variations of names were noted for searching purposes (e.g., Hewlett-
Packard also had Hewlett Packard and HP listed as applicable hits) and shortened for
maximum hits (e.g., Nintendo Ltd was reduced to Nintendo). Finally, MikroTik was added
by hand, due to its prevalence in the previous Sundial study.
The final list of manufacturers resulted in 55 entities; see Appendix B.
3.4 Noise Reduction
Preliminary frequency analysis was done on all banner fields by classification—e.g., the
frequency of a specific BACnet response was counted for each unique combination of
ICMP timestamp behaviors. This initial analysis did not attempt to differentiate by noise
and treated a number of functionally identical, but “noisy,” banners as unique entries. Even
so, it cut down significantly on the amount of data to be processed for individual protocols;
5.6 million lines of data were reduced to 0.9 million.
We considered using some form of fuzzy string matching to further cut down on noise.
Unfortunately, upon examination of the data, we concluded that any fuzzy string matching
algorithm would cut out differences we wanted to preserve as unique banners—such as
model numbers—as well as those we wanted to discard.
As such, noise reductionwas done through the use of regular expressions. Patternsmatching
the IP address format (including port, if they were immediately followed by a colon and port-
sized number) were stripped and replaced with a generic substring marking their location.
The same was done with hour-minute-second timestamps where fields were separated by
colons (overwhelmingly the most common time format). Weekdays and their common
contractions were stripped when followed by a delimiter (such as a white space). Similarly,
4Manufacturers with multiple subsidiaries were not filtered for at this stage. Unless a subsidiary had more
than 10 OUIs it was not counted, e.g., a manufacturer with exactly 10 registered OUIs across two subsidiaries
would have been excluded.
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dates were stripped, including months in either numbered or named form, and including
contractions.
Dates were the most difficult of the “standard” forms of noise to strip, due to the number
of accepted date formats and orders. While all common formats were replaced, some small
fraction of uncommon banners may retain dates and be counted separately.
Further manual examination led to more specialized cleanup. CWMP header responses
regularly had (more or less) unique nonces, so all CWMP headers with nonces had them
removed. Additionally, both FTP and Telnet had very common noisy strings in specific
formats—e.g., FTP servers commonly responded with a banner including the phrase “You
are user [number] of [number] allowed.” Nullification of these artificial difference was also
automated with regular expressions and string literal searches.
Final, reduced-noise frequency counts resulted in 0.4 million lines of data. This version of
the data was used for all frequency analyses.
For specific regular expressions used in noise reduction, see Appendix C.
3.5 Counteracting IP Churn
In order to counteract any noise or inaccuracies caused by IP churn, two strategies were
used.
First, minimum occurrence thresholds for banner inclusion were used in nearly all analyses.
These thresholds applied by header/banner protocol. For example, if aminimum threshold of
3 was used for BACnet when checking responses for simultaneously lazy and checksumLazy
IPs, any BACnet responses that occurred less than 3 times for that group were removed.
We assumed very rare banners for a behavior were theoretically due to IP churn replacing the
devices originally at that address, where the new devices with those banners did not display
the behavior. Thresholds were therefore used to eliminate these. Minimums were decided
for each behavioral group based loosely on the size of the group, with the assumption
that larger groups would experience more churn. (Thresholds also filtered entirely unique,
customized banners out.)
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Second, the entire fourth set of data described in section 3.1.4 and subsets of primary
(3.1.1) and uptime (3.1.2) data were also put through the above noise reduction. The
primary/uptime data subsets, henceforth referred to as March 1 data, covered approximately
the first two-fifths of scanned addresses. The March 1 dataset diverged from the Censys
scan’s date at maximum 14 instead of 16 days. The 3.1.4 dataset, henceforth referred to
as August 22 data, covered a small fraction of addresses that were probed with all 4 ICMP
requests consecutively. As this scan concluded on August 23, Censys historical data for it
was pulled from that date, and the August 22 dataset diverged less than a day at maximum.
We adopted the premise that scan data closer to the Censys data would have experienced
less churn. Therefore, we decided significant differences between March 1 data, August 22




This chapter discusses our results, including how much of the routable IPv4 space we found
to be ICMP timestamp responsive, the number and consistency of behaviors for unique
banners, and the number of manufacturers that displayed specific behaviors. We summarize
how many addresses were found in Censys for our analyses.
We also discuss differences between overall uptimers and (router) ITDK-uptimers, and
compare data from partial Sundial scans to the full scan.
4.1 Responsiveness of Internet to Timestamp Requests
Responsiveness of the internet can be evaluated through the primary set mentioned in
section 3.1.1. Although the IPv4 address space consists of 232 total IP addresses, a number of
these addresses are not publicly routable; they are allocated for private and service provider
addressing [24], [25]. As such, our initial probe covered all routable IPs—approximately
3.7 billion.
218,651,485 addresses were responsive to the initial probe, a response rate of about 6%.
This is a lower percentage than the original Sundial paper’s timestamp responsive 15% [2];
however, this can be explained by Sundial’s targets. The original study used a hitlist [5]
covering the most ping-responsive address in each /24 network—i.e., those addresses that
were most likely to reply to any ICMP messages. The full IPv4 scan covered addresses that
were not as responsive.
Once an address responded to an initial ICMP timestamp probe, it was added to the list
for the full four-probe Sundial scan [2]. Following Sundial scanning and classification, we
ended with a list of 197,415,236 successfully classified addresses—including those classi-
fied as “unknown.” The 21,236,249 missing addresses—about 9.7%—did not respond to
any ICMP timestamp probes following the initial scan and were dropped from our study.
(Possible reasons for this are discussed in Chapter 5.) Functionally speaking, however, this
means approximately 5% of routable IPv4 addresses are responsive to ICMP timestamps
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consistently enough to be classified by Sundial methodology. The occurrences of large
behavioral groups can be seen in Table 4.1.









Table 4.1. Broad Sundial Behavioral Groups Found in IPv4 Scan.
Note that there is overlap of behavioral groups—for example, something could be marked
both lazy and correct.
Responses overwhelmingly displayed lazy behavior. This suggests that a large percentage
of devices have a processing time of less than one of their chosen time units, that a large
percentage of devices duplicate their receive and transmit timestamps, or that both are true.
The original Sundial study discovered that the Linux and BSD operating systems both have
a genuinely lazy implementation of ICMP timestamp responses [2], so this is unsurprising.
Only 30.55% of responses were classified as appearing correct. The union of correct and
msb responses—i.e., responses that could theoretically be conformant—was 35.28%. This
means a full 64.72% of ICMP timestamp responsive devices definitively did not conform
to RFC 792 [3] and could have faulty implementations. Up to 1.26% of this may instead
be due to misconfigured local times on devices, and an unclear amount may be due to
clock drift and network congestion causing timestamps to fall outside of our margin of
error. Additionally, this behavior could be caused by middleboxes, as originally theorized
in Sundial [2].
There were no addresses that could be classified as “epoch” respondents in the IPv4-wide
scan. This is interesting, as the original Sundial study—on an address space approximately
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256 times smaller than Sunup—did find one epoch respondent. We theorize that either
the device was taken down or that clock drift unsynchronized it from the Sundial scanner’s
time. Sundial’s classification standards allow for an error margin of one second for epoch
time and would fail to evaluate a device more than one second off.
We also checked for theoretical “echo” behavior, a behavior where the respondent echoed
what it received in the originate timestamp into its receive and transmit timestamps. No
occurrences of this behavior were found.
For specific behavioral classifications and exact numbers, see Appendix D.
4.1.1 Comparison to August 22 dataset
The August 22 dataset described in section 3.1.4 was not a full scan of the routable IPv4
internet, and therefore cannot be used to evaluate overall responsiveness. It did, however,
use addresses from the ICMP timestamp single-probe—which may be a useful indicator of
churn.
Of the roughly 218 million addresses that were initially responsive to a single probe in
March, 215k were randomly selected. They resulted in 34,125 IP addresses responsive to
the full four-probe scan, or about 15.9%; significantly less than the 90.3% found in March.
This is potentially caused by IP churn over 4 months, by firewalls attempting to block
network scans, or by a mix of both.
Broad behavioral groups in this scan are summarized in Table 4.2. They seem to be roughly
comparable to the primary dataset, which is especially striking given the difference inmagni-
tude. This may be an indicator that—given that the August 22 data should have experienced
far less—IP churn during our 16-day Sundial run is not a highly influential factor in our data.
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Table 4.2. Broad Sundial Behavioral Groups Found in August 22 Scan.
4.2 Censys-ICMP Join
As previously discussed in section 3.2.1, only 16% of our classified IP addresses had
entries in Censys at all. This means that out of ICMP-responsive addresses, a full 84%—or
approximately 4% of the overall routable address space—were not Censys-responsive even
though they were responsive to timestamp requests.
Notably, these addresses had not been responsive for at minimum a week—as per Censys,
data on an IP address is removed if the address has not replied to probing for that long. We
propose three explanations for the 84% of addresses not included.
First, these addresses may not respond on all the common ports Censys scans, but also
not block ICMP. Second, this may be due to IP churn; an address could have been non-
responsive during the time of Censys’s scan, but responsive by the time of the Sundial
scan. Third, the administrators of those addresses may have opted-out of Censys scans.
Censys’s opt-out mechanism involves dropping traffic from their /23 measurement subnet,
and Censys provides no data on whether a lack of response is due to their traffic being
dropped or to a device with closed ports rejecting packets.
If the first explanation is true, it seems to suggest either a much greater amount of dynamic
IP addresses than Xie et al.’s study indicates [20], a large amount of static IP addresses that
provide no public services on common ports, or a mixture of both.
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Within Censys data for the full IPv4 address space onMarch 1, 2019, there were 26,743,002
addresses found that had no entries relevant to us—approximately 20.2% were not publicly
running anything on the 10 ports we evaluated for common services.
Within Sundial data, of the 31,500,486 successfully found in Censys, there were 6,563,115
addresses that did not respond to the 10 ports we evaluated, approximately 20.8%.
The full IPv4 data Censys scans and the Sundial-Censys subset seem to have comparable
activity on common ports. It must be noted that Censys addresses are those which are open
to port scanning in general, as Censys does not retain an IP unless it responds on some port.
This means the 6.5M Sundial addresses remaining must have a response on some other
port. However, given they respond on a port at all, ICMP timestamp responsive addresses
appear to be broadly representative of common ports in the IPv4 address space.
Of addresses found in Censys, incidences of response on specific ports were as shown in
Table 4.3.
Service/Port Total Responsive Addresses % of Addresses
FTP (20) 3,571,167 11.3%
SSH (22) 5,912,382 18.8%
Telnet (23) 1,061,692 3.4%
HTTP (80) 16,407,985 52.1%
Telnet (2323) 47,897 0.2%
CWMP (7547) 3,506,160 11.1%
HTTP (8080) 1,214,261 3.9%
HTTP (8888) 445,039 1.4%
HTTP (16992) 2,857 <0.1%
BACnet (47808) 3,555 <0.1%
Table 4.3. Banner Frequency In ICMP Timestamp Responsive Addresses
Found in Censys.
Note that there is overlap, so percentages will not add up to 100; i.e., certain addresses had
HTTP running on all of the HTTP ports listed instead of just one of them, or were running
more than one type of service. Note also that something running on a specific port does
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not necessarily mean it was the standard protocol. A small subset of IPs ran protocols on
non-standard ports, such as FTP on the Telnet port. Due to banner noisiness these were not
filtered out and percentages were not measured.
4.2.1 Comparison to August 22 dataset
Of the 34,125 IP addresses in the August 22 dataset, only 1,760 were found in Censys.
This is approximately 5.2%, a significant difference from the 16% for the primary dataset,
and is something that should have been unaffected by IP churn or firewalls. However, the
massive difference in magnitudes makes it difficult to say anything conclusive. Incidences
of response are shown in Table 4.4.
462 of these available-in-Censys addresses, or 26.3%, had none of the banner responses we
were evaluating. All but FTP, Telnet on the standard port 23, and HTTP on port 8080 had
lower response rates, but only in CWMP was the response rate lowered significantly.
Service/Port Total Responsive Addresses % of Addresses
FTP (20) 225 12.8%
SSH (22) 311 17.7%
Telnet (23) 81 4.6%
HTTP (80) 884 50.2%
Telnet (2323) 3 <0.1%
CWMP (7547) 95 5.4%
HTTP (8080) 102 5.8%
HTTP (8888) 22 1.3%
HTTP (16992) 0 0%
BACnet (47808) 0 0%
Table 4.4. Banner Frequency In August 22 Addresses Found in Censys.
4.3 Uptimers
Of the 197,415,236 responsive IP addresses in the primary dataset, 8,255,481were classified
as uptime when scanned approximately two months later—roughly 4.18% of all responsive
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addresses. Broad behavioral groups, as they were classified in the primary dataset, can be
seen in Table 4.5.
About 59.7% of these were labeled as only lazy in the primary dataset. These, and the
less than 1% of those labeled only normal, can probably be considered “true” uptimers.
However, 98.2% of uptimers had lazy within their behavioral classification—i.e., including
those that also had classifications such as checksumLazy. This number seems roughly
similar to the whole IPv4 space.
A large subset of uptimers—3,200,546, or about 38.8%—had their most significant bit set.
This deviates greatly from the 5.1% in the overall IPv4 space, and suggests that uptimers
are aware their behavior is non-conformant, or that they may be using the most significant
bit for another purpose.
Investigation of uptime behavior in the long-running probes demonstrates whymsb behavior
is so prevalent. Two different versions of uptime were noted. One of them treats timestamp
fields as 32-bit unsigned integers, and therefore has the most significant bit set half of the
time. This behavior wraps roughly every 49 days. The second behavior always has the most
significant bit set, and uses the remaining 31 bits; it wraps roughly every 25 days.
Only 15 uptimers were classified in the primary dataset as unknown.
Broad Behavior % Overall % checksumLazy % msb % checksumLazy,msb
lazy 98.22% 0.69% 37.95% 0.17%
normal 1.78% <0.01% 0.81% <0.01%
unknown <0.01% 0% 0% 0%
Table 4.5. Notable Sundial Behavioral Groups Found in Uptimers.
4.4 ITDK-Uptimers
Of 2,586,711 IP addresses in the ITDK list, 1,255,579 or 48.5% responded to ICMP
timestamp probing. Even compared to the 218.7M (≈6%) that were initially responsive
in section 4.1 rather than the final 197.4M (≈5%) pool, this is a huge difference. ITDK-
surveyed routers appear to be more responsive to ICMP timestamp requests than the full
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IPv4 space. Note that this should be taken with a grain of salt: ITDK routers are a subset
of the IPv4 space that is already known to be traceroute-responsive [19]. However, this is
expected behavior; at a minimum, routers are less likely to be behind a firewall.
In the 1.3M responsive ITDK addresses, 88,884 ITDK-uptimers were discovered. This is
approximately 7.1%, a greater percentage than overall uptimers. Routers seem marginally
more likely to be uptimers.
ITDK-uptimer IP addresses were compared to the addresses in the primary set in order to
classify their behavior. 86,291 were found; 2,593 were not present at all. Broad behavioral
groups of those that were found can be seen in Table 4.6.
Interestingly, when compared to the uptimers, a full 23,163 addresses were in the ITDK
group but not among the uptime addresses. Given the ITDK group’s status as a subset of
overall IPv4 addresses, both should have been classified as uptimers. As with the August 22
set, the 2.6k missing addresses and the 23.2k non-uptime addresses may or may not be due
to IP churn over several months. Addresses in either group may also have not responded to
an initial probe and been dropped from the scan list.
35,547 ITDK-uptimers had their most significant bit set, or about 40.0%. This is quite
similar to the overall uptimers. No ITDK-uptimers were classified as unknown.
Broad Behavior % Overall % checksumLazy % msb % checksumLazy,msb
lazy 90.03% 0.05% 39.93% 0.01%
normal 2.3% 0.01% 0.08% <0.01%
unknown 0% 0% 0% 0%
Table 4.6. Notable Sundial Behavioral Groups Found in ITDK-Uptimers.
4.5 Behavior Volume in Unique Banners
All unique banners had a certain behavioral volume—a number of classifications that the
banner appeared in. For example, if 100 IP addresses responded on the FTP port with the
same banner, and half of them showed “lazy” behavior, while the other half were classified
with both “lazy” and “checksumLazy” behavior, then the volume would be two.
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Banners were measured separated by common protocol/port. Common protocols on dif-
ferent ports were combined—e.g., HTTP banners were combined across all four measured
HTTP ports.
Behavioral volume was measured with a different threshold for each protocol. Thresholds
were roughly proportional to the amount of responses a certain protocol had as seen in
Fig 4.3, with a minimum threshold of two. They were intended to eliminate those banners
that were categorized erroneously due to IP churn, as well as those banners that were cus-
tomized singletons; any banners that had fewer instances than the threshold were discarded.
Through this we hoped to estimate what proportion of banners were both accurately classi-
fied and possible to fingerprint. Wemade the assumption that protocols withmore responses
were likely to have more inaccurate responses due to IP churn and more customized unique
responses, and so gave these protocols higher thresholds. Thresholds are listed in Table 4.7.







Table 4.7. Thresholds for Behavior Volume Analysis.
Finally, behavioral volume was separately measured for only those banners that listed a
common manufacturer, where common manufacturers include those chosen through the
method described in section 3.2.2. This was another attempt to estimate what proportion
of banners was possible to fingerprint. The manufacturer-inclusion analysis did not use
thresholds.
Results from the primary set (see section 3.1.1) were compared with both March 1 and
August 22 results (see section 3.5) to further estimate the effect of IP churn. The BACnet
protocol was the one exception: there were no BACnet results in the small August 22
dataset, so BACnet was only compared to the March 1 dataset.
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(a) Primary and March 1 (b) Primary and August 22
Figure 4.1. Behavior Volume for FTP Banners
An example of results can be seen in Fig. 4.1. For graphic results for all protocols, see
Appendix E.
In primary data, when banners below the threshold of required instances are allowed, a
significantly higher percentage of banners have a behavior volume of one. This distribution
is very pronounced in FTP banners, where—without the threshold of 10 instances—more
than 90% of banners have a single behavior. With the threshold, the percentage shrinks to
approximately 50%.
However, a deeper dive into the relevant data shows that a threshold of 2 would be nearly
as effective. FTP banners which display a single behavior overwhelmingly do so because
they only appear once; of 115,258 single-behavior FTP banners, 111,430 (or 98.7%) are
singletons. Many of these singletons are customized banners and will only ever appear on
one device, which means a single behavior by default.
This pattern appears to hold in all primary data banners exceptCWMPandBACnet. (CWMP
has no single-behavior banners.) However, the threshold’s effect is least pronounced in
HTTP; HTTP also has only 53,995 single-behavior responses, and 42,241 of those responses
(or 78.2%) appear only once. This is unsurprising, as HTTP is conventionally unlikely to
have the server portion of its header uniquely customized compared to FTP, SSH, and
Telnet. The latter three protocols often have banners that include welcome messages and
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have no conventional format; HTTP’s server section is meant only to identify the server
software and has a conventional format [26].
March 1 data mirrors primary data in having proportionately fewer banners with a behavior
volume of one after a threshold is applied. In August 22 banners, the pattern holds only in
SSH and Telnet.
When thresholds are applied, primary and March 1 data have near-identical distributions
in FTP, HTTP, and Telnet, a similar one in CWMP, and a partially similar one in SSH.
This seems to indicate that after 14 days of potential churn have already passed, two days
of IP churn are ineffectual enough to be eliminated with thresholds. August 22 data is not
similar, but it is difficult to say whether this is due to less IP churn or simply a much smaller
data set.
Requiring common manufacturers improves or roughly equals average volume in BACnet
and Telnet, as well as August 22 CWMP and primary/March 1 HTTP. This is encouraging
in the cases of BACnet and Telnet at a minimum, as it indicates that likely prospects for
fingerprinting have more easily “identifiable” banners.
The banners with the most unusual distributions are CWMP and BACnet. BACnet is the
only protocol which has an average lower volume the more constrained the data set is.
CWMP has the most discrete behavior volumes.
In general, while uniquely customized responses are useless for our purposes, behavior
volumes seem to indicate that ICMP timestamp behavior testing will not apply everywhere
but can help in fingerprinting. After thresholds are applied, a minimum of 20% of primary
data banners are consistent in their timestamp behavior. This number grows to 50% in the
August 22 data; the real number is likely somewhere between the two.
4.6 Behavior Consistency in Unique Banners
All unique banners also had a behavioral consistency—the percentage of their most common
classification out of all classifications. For example, assume 100 IP addresses responded
on the FTP port with the same banner, where 40% of them showed “lazy” behavior, 25%
showed both “lazy” and “checksumLazy” behavior, and all other classifications had lower
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(a) Primary and March 1 (b) Primary and August 22
Figure 4.2. Behavior Consistency for SSH Banners
percentages. The behavioral consistency for that banner would be 40%.
As with behavioral volume, banners were segregated by common protocol/port, and com-
mon protocols on different ports were combined. We also compared the primary set (see
section 3.1.1) with both March 1 and August 22 results (see section 3.5) to estimate the
effect of IP churn. Once again the exception is BACnet, due to the lack of BACnet responses
in the August 22 dataset.
We judged that consistency should be less affected by IP churn, as itwas based on percentages
rather than direct quantities. Therefore, we eliminated only those banners which showed
up a single time across all behaviors; this was intended to get rid of just completely unique
customized banners. We used only banners over this threshold, rather than comparing
banners “over minimum threshold” to all banners.
For graphic results for all protocols, see Appendix F.
Unexpectedly, all August 22 data was less consistent than primary data. We anticipated it
would have less IP churn and therefore more consistency. However, this is easily explained
through the scale of data collected. Any network hiccup in 1.8k data points is much more
significant than in 37M data points. Similarly, due to less data points, August 22 data had
an absolute minimum consistency higher than the primary data.
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March 1 data is nearly identical to primary data in SSH consistency, and arguably similar in
HTTP and CWMP. FTP, BACnet, and Telnet are slightly less consistent than primary data.
In general, out of primary data, a minimum of 60% of banners are at least 50% consistent in
behavior. This is very encouraging for the use of ICMP timestamps in fingerprinting. Even
assuming that there is no loss in consistency due to IP churn, anything that is truly over
50% consistent can be used in fingerprinting by probability. Furthermore, approximately
50% of Telnet respondents are nearly 100% consistent, and other protocols such as FTP are
not far behind.
4.7 Behaviors by Manufacturer
To follow up on the original Sundial [2], we analyze the presence of manufacturers using a
list derived as described in section 3.2.2. Analyses are separated by broad behavioral groups
as listed in Table 4.1, excluding “timezone” and “unknown.” Due to many classifications’
presence in multiple behavioral groups, classifications may show up twice.
It is important to note that this analysis is based on individual IP addresses, not on unique
banners. Furthermore, if more than one manufacturer’s name shows up in a single address’s
responses, both are counted. A device can therefore count for both Microsoft and Asus,
for example. Among the primary set, there were 3,349 addresses that showed multiple
manufacturers; 13 showed more than two manufacturers. The majority were combinations
of Microsoft and Cisco.
Analysis was performed two ways—using the density of manufacturers in a certain behav-
ioral group’s behaviors, and using the density of individual behavioral group’s behaviors in
manufacturers. For the purposes of filtering out IP churn and to make results decipherable,
we used minimum thresholds for all groups as described in section 3.5. Thresholds were
chosen roughly proportionate to the amount of results for each group as seen in Fig 4.1,
then adjusted for better graph legibility. They are listed in Table 4.8.
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Table 4.8. Thresholds for Manufacturer Analysis.
Over the entirety of the primary group, the second most common manufacturer is nearly an
order of magnitude less than the most common, and the sixth manufacturer is approximately
an order of magnitude lower than the fifth. The five most common manufacturers are listed
in Table 4.9.






Table 4.9. Most Common Manufacturers in ICMP Responsive Devices.
In general, even when accounting for complicating factors like IP churn, manufacturers very
rarely have a monopoly over some form of behavior. There are exceptions, however. As can
be seen in Fig 4.3, Microsoft does seem to be the only manufacturer to display correctLE
in a meaningful capacity, and Cisco seems to be the only manufacturer to demonstrate
correctMSB. Certain other msb or normal behaviors seem to only appear in Cisco or
Microsoft.
Only Microsoft seems to show stuck behavior without stuck0 or stuck1; only Samsung
displays stuck0 more than once; only Huawei demonstrates stuck1 or stuckLE1. However,
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Figure 4.3. Manufacturers by “Correct” Behavior
with the possible exception of Huawei, we cannot say whether these are meaningful labels
given that the sample size is so small. Similarly, Hewlett Packard appears to be the only
manufacturer to show normal, reflectRx, and msbTx combined—but this behavior only
appears six times total.
Of correct behaviors, nearly all that are normal rather than lazy areCisco andMicrosoft—but
it is difficult to saywhether this is because of lazy implementations by everyone else, because
certain Cisco and Microsoft devices process significantly slower than average, or just due to
their prevalence. Interestingly, Microsoft is the only manufacturer to heavily display buggy
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behavior. This is strange, as the htons() bug is specific to Linux kernel 3.18 according to [2].
It seems to suggest that there is some subset of Linux 3.18 devices running a Microsoft
service, or that a similar bug exists in some Microsoft devices.
Lenovo/Motorola is also unusual, as the only time it shows up with a significant fraction of
a behavior is in reflect. However, Lenovo appears in lazy addresses more times total than it
does in reflect.
For graphic results for all behavioral groups, see Appendix G.
4.8 Uptime and ITDK-Uptime Behaviors
Manufacturer presence was also analyzed in Uptime (see section 3.1.2) and ITDK-Uptime
(see section 3.1.3) datasets, as in section 4.6. A threshold of five was used for both uptime
datasets.
The five most common manufacturers in the Uptime dataset were as seen in Table 4.10.






Table 4.10. Most Common Manufacturers in “Uptime” Behavior.
Even the most common manufacturer made up less than 0.1% of all addresses classified
as uptime. However, where uptime manufacturers do exist, there is a definite difference
compared to overall manufacturer responses. Huawei is overwhelmingly the most likely
to occur, and is slightly more likely to occur in uptime devices than all ICMP responsive
devices; furthermore, Samsung has replaced MikroTik. (There were only 151 instances of
MicroTik among the Uptime dataset.)
Samsung is particularly interesting, as only 2767 instances of Samsung existed in the primary
dataset. This means 22.44% of ICMP timestamp responsive Samsungs are classified as
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Figure 4.4. Manufacturers by “Uptime” Behavior
uptime. Ofmanufacturerswithmore than 10 instances classified as uptime, only Technicolor
is similar, with 180 instances for 31.9% of Technicolor devices.
ITDK-Uptime data was expected to be a subset of all IP addresses classified as uptime,
though not all uptime-responding routers were expected to be present in ITDK-Uptime
data. (See section 4.3 for initial evidence that this was incorrect.)
As ITDK-Uptime was not a comprehensive selection of all routers in the IPv4 space,
manufacturers that appeared in Uptime results and not ITDK-Uptime are inconclusive. In
fact, certain manufacturers—such as MikroTik and Netgear—produce nearly exclusively
routers, and were not present in the ITDK-Uptime dataset.
However, as can be seen in Fig. 4.4, Sercomm appeared a full 32 times in the ITDK-Uptime
group without appearing even once in Uptime. (More accurately, Sercomm appeared three
times in the Uptime group, and was then filtered out as IP churn by the threshold.)
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Figure 4.5. “Uptime” Behaviors by Manufacturer
4.9 Device and Router Fingerprinting
Certain device models can be determined to display only a single behavior. For exam-
ple, Samsung SWL-3300AP—a wireless access point—only appears in stuck0 addresses.
Six Samsung printer models—C140x, C145x, C1860, CLP-680, CLX-4190, and CLX-
6260—only ever display lazy and lazy_msb behaviors in the primary set, but also appear in
uptime addresses. This means they are showing the 32-bit unsigned integer uptime behavior
described in section 4.2.1.
Per-manufacturer behaviors, however, may be more valuable. One goal of this work was
to determine whether ICMP timestamps were a useful method of fingerprinting for routers,
which are often far less responsive to fingerprinting techniques than end devices. They
provide non-routing services less often and drop most traffic directed specifically to them.
As routers regularly use ICMP for control and route diagnostics, we hypothesized they
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would be more likely to respond to ICMP timestamps.
Even knowing the manufacturer may be incredibly helpful in narrowing down a device’s
identity. As mentioned in section 4.6, certain behaviors are only associated with one
manufacturer, as evidenced by the banners they are associated with. CorrectMSB indicating
Cisco and stuck1/stuckLE1 indicatingHuawei are probably themost useful of these for router
fingerprinting purposes. It is also useful to know that Microsoft and Cisco are functionally
the only manufacturers that display correct and normal behavior rather than correct and
lazy.
Of course, even this evidence is not conclusive; there may be non-Cisco devices that show
correctMSB, but do not respond to any of the services we retrieved banners from, or do
not name their manufacturer in their banners. It is also important to note that a timestamp
behavior would not be enough to fully fingerprint a device, as even a behavior with a single
manufacturer applies to multiple devices.
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CHAPTER 5:
Conclusions and Future Work
Over the course of thiswork, we determined that—in the routable IPv4 space—approximately
6% of addresses are responsive to ICMP timestamps. When scanned with four different
probes over 16 days, the number that consistently answer shrinks to 5%. This may be an
explicit response to scanning, an effect of network congestion, a consequence of devices
being powered down, or a result of IP churn.
Of responsive addresses, only about one-thirdwere theoretically conformant to RFC 792 [3].
Responsive addresses were also overwhelmingly classified as lazy. This is not unexpected,
as the original Sundial work [2] had similar results. Implementation may not necessarily
be lazy—normal hosts may appear lazy if their processing time for a message is less than
one millisecond, and Sundial reported that many hosts appeared normal from one vantage
point and not another. Because of this, we conclude that lazy and normal behaviors are of
minimal use in fingerprinting.
A comparatively small amount of timestamp responsive addresses could be associated with
Censys header/banner data. This may be because they are ICMP responsive but do not
provide any other services, because they provide services on ports other than those we
checked, or because they simply block Censys scanning.
Out of those ICMP responsive addresses that had banners and headers, we determined that
there is a correlation between certain behavior classifications and manufacturers, and that
there are banner responses that are uniquely associated with one classification. Among
banner responses that are not consistent to one behavior, a majority are at a minimum
50% consistent to one behavior. We therefore conclude that—while they are not suitable
for fingerprinting by themselves—ICMP timestamp behaviors can be used to assist in
fingerprinting. They may be particularly useful in the case of routers, which tend to respond
to fewer traditional fingerprinting techniques.
We used samples of smaller datasets with tighter time frames to see if behavioral inconsis-
tency could be blamed on IP churn. While this cut down on maximum behaviors seen, it
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did not explain the inconsistency.
The uptime behavior, one not discussed in the original Sundial, makes up just over 4% of
responsive addresses. It also encompasses two varieties: one where the entire timestamp
field is used as a 32-bit unsigned integer counting uptime, and onewhere themost significant
bit is always set and the remaining 31 bits are used as an unsigned integer. Where possible
to associate with a manufacturer, devices with uptime behavior are significantly more likely
to be Huawei than overall devices that are ICMP timestamp responsive.
5.1 Primary Takeaways
• 6% of routable IPv4 addresses respond to ICMP timestamp requests.
• 1% of routable IPv4 addresses respond to ICMP timestamp requests and to at least
one of 10 ports running common services.
• Only about one-third of routable IPv4 addresses respond correctly to ICMP times-
tamp requests. All other addresses have an incorrect implementation, are behind
a middlebox that distorts ICMP responses, have an incorrect time configuration, or
respond incorrectly for some other reason.
• Amajority of unique banners that devices respond with are at least 50% consistent in
one timestamp behavior (and mean the behavior can be used in fingerprinting).
• Some unique banners that devices respond with are 100% consistent in one timestamp
behavior (and mean the behavior can be used in fingerprinting).
• Certain timestamp behaviors are only seen in devices from one manufacturer (as
implied by banner responses).
– CorrectLE is only meaningfully seen in Microsoft.
– CorrectMSB is only meaningfully seen in Cisco.
– Stuck1/stuckLE1 are only seen in Huawei.
• Certain models of device only show a single behavior (as implied by banner re-
sponses).
• Uptime devices are about 4% of ICMP timestamp devices.
– There are two varieties of uptime behavior, a 32-bit unsigned integer version
and a 31-bit unsigned integer version.
– Uptime devices are far more likely to be Huawei devices.
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5.2 Future Work
We recommend periodic probing across the IPv4 space to establish patterns of behavior.
This would help determine what percentage of the internet is ICMP timestamp responsive
on a regular basis, and what caused the decrease to 5% responsiveness in our scans.
While we found some devices associated with a certain behavior, associating banners and
classifications with devices on a large scale was infeasible within the scope of this work.
Future work which wished to pursue fingerprinting would have to create more sophisticated
noise reduction techniques, as well as do manual research to associate banners to devices.
Similarly, more devices should be directly obtained and probed in order to establish ground
truths, particularly as less than 15% of responsive addresses had useful banner responses.
Finally, the two uptime varieties should be investigated as separate behaviors.
We did not investigate the full scope of potentially useful services/ports; future work may
wish to investigate additional well-known ports. It may also be prudent to scan banners
along with Sundial’s ICMP probes, rather than relying on Censys, to minimize IP churn
even further.
In the long term, ICMP timestamp fingerprinting should be integrated into network scanning
tools such as Nmap [1].
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APPENDIX A:
Case Studies of Banner Noisiness
Banner noisiness made extracting models and analyzing behaviors by banner difficult.
Many banners were completely unique but clearly custom-set, and no longer offered any
illuminating information for device identification. For example, some banners from FTP
and SSH replies:
220 This site is restricted for use of Cellebrite Training Staff
only.
220 Hm...
Look at you, hacker. A pathetic creature of meat and bone, panting
and sweating as you run through my corridors. How can you
challenge a perfect, immortal, machine?
NOPE2.0-NOPENOPE
These above unique banners were a functionally inconsequential, tiny percentage of the
overall banner collection, and were truly unique. More disruptive were banners that were
otherwise entirely identical but that displayed their own IP address, the date, or a number
of users. Examples of the following included:
PacketShaper (193.238.28.126) Password:
PacketShaper (194.224.251.100) Password:
QTerm(v1.0.4) Tuesday, 26 February 2019 08:48:32 ZMM100 login:
QTerm(v1.0.4) Tuesday, 26 February 2019 09:02:52 ZMM100 login:
QTerm(v1.0.4) Tuesday, 26 February 2019 09:08:13 ZMM100 login:
220---------- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] ---------- 220-
You are user number 7 of 50 allowed. 220-Local time is now 16:12.
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Server port: 23. 220-This is a private system - No anonymous
login 220-IPv6 connections are also welcome on this server. 220
You will be disconnected after 15 minutes of inactivity.
220---------- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] ---------- 220-
You are user number 8 of 50 allowed. 220-Local time is now 01:36.
Server port: 23. 220-This is a private system - No anonymous
login 220-IPv6 connections are also welcome on this server. 220
You will be disconnected after 15 minutes of inactivity.
There were also those that inserted a unique substring (seemingly a username) into each
otherwise identical banner. It is very likely not all of these were filtered out, but one that
was handled was Netrouter 2G, such as the following:
Linux 2.4.30-pre1-p1_01 (DILUMAR) (2)
------------------------------------ Welcome to NetRouter 2G from
Digitel ------------------------------------ DILUMAR login:
Linux 2.4.30-pre1-p1_01 (ECONSULTING) (1)
------------------------------------ Welcome to NetRouter 2G from
Digitel ------------------------------------ ECONSULTING login:
Linux 2.4.30-pre1-p1_01 (FADIPA) (7)
------------------------------------ Welcome to NetRouter 2G from
Digitel ------------------------------------ FADIPA login:
The biggest obstacle, however, was the inconsistent presentation of manufacturers and
models. As manufacturers did not deign to always have their name in a standardized place
in every banner, extraction of manufacturers had to be done off a pre-built list. Furthermore,
manufacturers were inconsistent in their own spelling and in whether or not they used
contractions of their name. Consider the following examples with Hewlett-Packard:
HP Printer Enter username:
********************************************************************
Copyright (c) 2010-2017 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
* * Without the owner’s prior written consent,





2J?7l3;23r?6l1;1H?25l1;1HHP J4813A ProCurve Switch 2524 Firmware
revision F.05.17 Copyright (C) 1991-2003 Hewlett-Packard Co.
All Rights Reserved. RESTRICTED
RIGHTS LEGEND Use, duplication , or disclosure by the Government
is subject to restrictions as set forth in subdivision (b) (3)
(ii) of the Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software
clause at 52.227-7013. HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY, 3000
Hanover St., Palo Alto, CA 94303 1;24r20;1H24;1HPress any key to
continue20;1H?25h
Asmay clearly be seen, slightly different punctuationwas used; this may have been a product
ofminor re-brandings, but didmake distinguishing and sortingmanufacturersmore difficult.
Manufacturers with multi-word names often had to be cut down to just the first word in
order to be reliably found.
Manufacturers also had no consistent way of reporting model names relative to their name.
Even if all model names had immediately followed manufacturer names, they would have
been difficult to extract (consider "Hewlett-Packard Co" versus "Hewlett Packard Enterprise
Development LP" above). However, as the following sampler from Telnet shows, model
names could be nearly anywhere in the banner:
Welcome to DASAN Zhone Solutions Model: ZNID-GE-2426
A1-UK Router Release: S4.1.048 Copyright (C)
2009-2017 by DASAN Zhone Solutions , Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Confidential , Unpublished Property of DASAN Zhone Solutions.
Rights Reserved Under the Copyright Laws of the United States.
Login:
"Linux 2.4.30-pre1-p1_01 (XXXXX)
------------------------------------ Welcome to NetRouter 2G from
Digitel ------------------------------------ XXXXX login:"
************************************************ Welcome
to ZXR10 5928PS Switch of ZTE Corporation
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************************************************ Username:
BLM1500 - Broadband Loop Multiplexer Copyright 2001-2007 Entrisphere
Inc. Fabric & Control Processor (ttyp0)
WAVECAST(TM) MMC Technology , Inc.(http://www.mmctech.com) Wireless
Accesspoint MW-1700AP (3.5.2) GSM-4F-406-MMC-1 login:
This meant that models could not be extracted without an existing list of models or to be
entirely sorted through by hand, something which was outside of the scope of this study’s
ability to do.
There weremany banners which ran on non-standard ports - for example, we found instances
of SSH running on the standard Telnet port, FTP running on the standard SSH and Telnet
ports, and HTTP running on the SSH port. This list is non-comprehensive and covers only
those banners which used non-standard ports often enough to be easily spotted. There were
likely other combinations.
CWMP responses had one particularly odd behavior. While they tended to have nonces
unless they had only a "basic" realm, which we treated as noise, not all nonces were
completely unique. For example, the following CWMP responses recurred a full 1702 and
1694 times, respectively:
"Digest realm=""IgdAuthentication"", domain=""/"", nonce=""
IGEwNDNlMTA6NTMzOGRlNjA6OWY4ODQzMzA="", qop=""auth"", algorithm=
MD5"




For researcher illumination, the following partial banner is offered. This banner was not
unique aside from the server name in the final line:
-----------------------------------------------------
ATTITUDE ADJUSTMENT (Attitude Adjustment , r1327)
-----------------------------------------------------
* 1/4 oz Vodka Pour all ingredients into mixing
* 1/4 oz Gin tin with ice, strain into glass.
* 1/4 oz Amaretto
* 1/4 oz Triple sec
* 1/4 oz Peach schnapps
* 1/4 oz Sour mix








The table following lists the final 55 manufacturers used for searching within banners,
including any variations of a single manufacturer used. Name variations shorter than 4
letters generally required at least one trailing whitespace to be counted as an instance.



























hewlett packard, hp, hewlett-packard zyxel
htc
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The following regular expression was used for trimming standard IP addresses and ports.
\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}(:\d{2,5})?
The following regular expression was used for trimming standard timestamps.
\d{1,2}\:\d{1,2}\:\d{1,2}







Additionally, the following substrings were used in some individual banner types to detect
and replace specific noisy strings. Note leading whitespace in some substrings.








Sorry, Dear! telnet service is still in lock-time, You have to wait
Welcome to NetRouter 2G from Digitel
You are user











The table following lists the entirety of ICMP responsive addresses, enumerated by Sundial
classification [2]. This data is from the primary set described in 3.1.1 only. It excludes the
“uptime” classification, which would be scattered through multiple classification groups.
Certain classifications may have contradictory behaviors, such as the four instances of
“reflect_timezone.” In these cases, the classifier was unable to parse which classification
was correct - e.g., the scanner happened to compute hashes that in timestamp form were
timezone-offset from the current time. It is impossible to determine if the respondent
reflected the receive and transmit timestamps or genuinely reported a non-UTC time.
Other classifications may be redundant. For example, any classification with “correctMSB”
must by necessity also include “msb” - correct-msb requires the most significant bit to be
set. (However, an address that is classified msb is not necessarily correct-msb.)
Table D.1. Full Sundial Behavioral Groups Found in IPv4 Scan.
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Table D.1 – continued from previous page
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Table D.1 – continued from previous page
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Table D.1 – continued from previous page







































See section 4.4 for thresholds used.
(a) Primary and March 1
Figure E.1. Behavior Volume for BACnet Banners
(a) Primary and March 1 (b) Primary and August 22
Figure E.2. Behavior Volume for CWMP Banners
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(a) Primary and March 1 (b) Primary and August 22
Figure E.3. Behavior Volume for FTP Banners (Duplicate)
(a) Primary and March 1 (b) Primary and August 22
Figure E.4. Behavior Volume for HTTP Banners
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(a) Primary and March 1 (b) Primary and August 22
Figure E.5. Behavior Volume for SSH Banners
(a) Primary and March 1 (b) Primary and August 22
Figure E.6. Behavior Volume for Telnet Banners
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See section 4.5 for thresholds used.
(a) Primary and March 1
Figure F.1. Behavior Consistency for BACnet Banners
(a) Primary and March 1 (b) Primary and August 22
Figure F.2. Behavior Consistency for CWMP Banners
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(a) Primary and March 1 (b) Primary and August 22
Figure F.3. Behavior Consistency for FTP Banners
(a) Primary and March 1 (b) Primary and August 22
Figure F.4. Behavior Consistency for HTTP Banners
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(a) Primary and March 1 (b) Primary and August 22
Figure F.5. Behavior Consistency for SSH Banners (Duplicate)
(a) Primary and March 1 (b) Primary and August 22
Figure F.6. Behavior Consistency for Telnet Banners
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See section 4.6 for thresholds used.
Figure G.1. Manufacturers by “Correct” Behavior (Duplicate)
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Figure G.2. “Correct” Behaviors by Manufacturer
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Figure G.3. Manufacturers by “Lazy” Behavior
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Figure G.4. “Lazy” Behaviors by Manufacturer
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Figure G.5. Manufacturers by “ChecksumLazy” Behavior
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Figure G.6. “ChecksumLazy” Behaviors by Manufacturer
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Figure G.7. Manufacturers by “Normal” Behavior
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Figure G.8. “Normal” Behaviors by Manufacturer
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Figure G.9. Manufacturers by “MSB” Behavior
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Figure G.10. “MSB” Behaviors by Manufacturer
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Figure G.11. Manufacturers by “Stuck” Behavior
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Figure G.12. “Stuck” Behaviors by Manufacturer
78
Figure G.13. Manufacturers by “Reflect” Behavior
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Figure G.14. “Reflect” Behaviors by Manufacturer
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